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Volume XXXVIII JUNE, 1934 Number 4
THE DEFINITION OF CRIME
*W. H. HITCHLER
"The word crime," says a Pennsylvania court' "is a generic word of
wide significance, and there has been no universal adoption of a precise,
definite, and exclusive meaning to be attached to it."
2
Judicial definitions of the term are extremely scanty and not very infor-
mative,3 "Well knowing the idiosyncrasies, often in the nature of historical
survivals, of our unkempt criminal law, our judges have hesitated to essay
anything like a watertight definition of crime.", Perhaps this is due to the
fact that there is "rarely need for courts to define crime."'
Legislatures have usually been no more successful than the courts in
defining crime. 6 Their definitions are not such as would be likely to be
adopted if the law were "restated" ov codified.7
It has been stated that "nobody indeed will ever be able to attempt it
(the definition of crime)-except a codifier who has a charter to fashion the
whole existing system into something resembling shape and consistency;",
but the inability of the text writers, who create what has been called aptly
*B.L., University of Virginia Law School. 1905; D.C.L.. Dickinson College. 1932; LL.D.,
St. Francis College. 1932: Professor Dickinson School of Law. 1906-: Dean of Dickinson
School of Law. 1930 -.
'Allen v. C., 77 Pa. Super. Ct. 249. per Head, J. See also, Parsons, Crime and the Crim-
inal, p. 129.
2Compare the statement of the New Jersey court: "I am not aware that any jurist, in any
age of the common law, has ever doubted as to the meaning of the word crime." Matter
of Voorhees, 32 N. 1. L. 141, per Beasley. C. J. Balzac. in the "Magic Skin," makes Raphael
say, "Crime, there's a word which has all the height of the gallows and all the depth of the
Seine,"
sWinfield, The Law of Tort, p. 193.
'Allen, Legal Duties, p. 230,
5Winfleld. The Law of Tort, p. 194.
816 C. J. p. 53.
lWinfield, The Law of Tort, p. 194.
$Alien, Legal Duties, p. 230.
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"the literary law,'"' has not been due to lack of effort, but to the intractability
of the subject matter.
Definitions of the term crime by those who have expounded the criminal
law are indeed numerous and unsatisfactory. Perhaps they are numerous
because thcy arc unsatisfactory. The following definitions arc quoted without
distinction in a recent case:1"
"A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law for-
bidding or commanding it.""'
"An act which subjects the doer to legal punishment.
' ' 2
"The commission or omission of an act which the law forbids or com-
mands on the ground of public policy, under the pain of punishment to be
imposed by the state in its own name.""3
"A wrong which the government notices as injurious to the public and
punishes in what is called a criminal proceeding in its own name."H4
These definitions, respectively, seem to regard the distinctive attribute
of crime to be its prohibition by law, its punishment, its prosecution by the
state, its injurious effect upon the public. It will be sufficiently in accord
with these definitions, and convenient for our present purposes, to define a
crime as an act which is prohibited by law because injurious to the public
and for which the actor may be prosecuted and punished in the name of the
state. 15 The merits, or defects, of this definition will become apparent as
the discussion progresses. It presents for consideration the following topics:
1. An act.
2. Prohibition by Law.
3. Punishment.
4. Prosecution.
5. Injury to Public.'
AN ACT
Every crime includes a physical element which is called the criminal
act. A mere mental operation, such as hoping, expecting or intending is
fJenks, The New Jurisprudence, p. 108.
"0C. v. Shields. 50 Pa. Super, Ct. 194.
"Blackstone. Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 5.
'"Standard Dictionary.
"3Clark, Criminal Law, p. 1.
14Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 32.
"5For somewhat similar definitions, see 16 C. J. p. 51 and Robinson, Elementary Law,
2nd Ed.. sec. 460. The Wickersham report defines a crime as "a violation of the will of the
State which commands that designated human acts shall not take place and threatens the
application of a particular stated reaction, the penalty, if the prohibition is ignored." No.
13, p. 5.
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never criminal. 17 The law, it is said, cannot regulate the thoughts and intents
of the "heart." The best it can do, because of the evidential difficulties
involved, is to punish acts, and it would be unreasonable to require the law
to detect and punish criminal intent."-! Furthermore the aim of the law is
not to punish sins but to prevent certain external results.",
The required act may be positive or negative-an act of commission or an
act of omission. The perpetration of some crimes requires an act of com-
mission; the perpetration of others requires an act of omission; and some
crimes may be perpetrated by either an act of commission or by an act of
omission. The great majority of crimes involve acts of commission, "Omis-
sions, no matter how reprehensible, are usually not regarded as criminal." 2°
PROHIBITION BY LAW
An act to be a crime must, it is said, be prohibited by law. "  No matter
how morally reprehensible or economically injurious an act is, it is not a
crime unless it is prohibited by law. =- "Technically, from the legal stand-
point, the enactment forbidding the act causes the act forbidden to become a
crime at that moment. As a corollary of this, therefore, no act is a crime
which is not legally forbidden."-2 1 The question whether an act is a crime
is therefore not "a question of fact to be solved by an analysis of acts, but a
question of law to be settled by reference to legal definitions and distinc-
tions."
2
4
The fact that the actor thought that the act which he did was prohibited
by law is not sufficient if the act in reality was not so prohibited, This is true
whether the mistake of the actor was one of:
(1) fact, as where an American soldier joined American troops thinking
that they were British troops.25
"Interesting and instructive discussions of the meaning of the term crime may be found
in Kenny's Criminal Law, 14th ed., p. 3, Winfield's Law of Tort p. 190 and Allen's Legal
Duties, p. 230.
17Kelley v. C.. 1 Grant (Pa.) 184; Smith v- C., 54 Pa. 209; Smith v. Blachley. 188 Pa.
550; C. v. McGregor, 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 343.
18Smith v. C., 54 Pa. 212; C. v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 94; Kinnane. Anglo-American Law,
p. 30.
19Holmes, The Common Law, p. 54.
2OTrain, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 10. The physical element of crime has been dis-
cussed in a previous number of this Review, vol. 26, p. 117. It will be discussed again in
a forthcoming volume of this review.
2116 C. J. p. 64; May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl. 885, 7 L, R. A. (N. S.) 286;
Ware v. Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 488.
226 Dickinson Law Review, p. 227; Robinson, Elementary Law, 2nd ed. sec. 461.
23Parsons, Crime and the Criminal, p. 151; Clark, Criminal Law, 3rd. ed. p. 3,
24Robinson, Elementary Law, 2nd ed., sec. 461.
23Res. v. Mallin, 1 Dallas (Pa.) 33. See also Smith v. Blachley, 188 Pa. 550.
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(2) law, as where a man took wild bees mistakenly believing that ac-
cording to law they belonged to his neighbor."'
In the first case the actor thought that he was doing an act which was
prohibited by law and constituted treason. In the second case he thought
that he was doing an act which was prohibited by law and constituted larceny.
In both cases it was held that he was not guilty.
Since a crime is an act prohibited by law, it follows that an act which
the law commands or authorizes is not a crime. "It is of course a legal
solecism to call that a crime which is maintained by authority of law.- 2 T In
order that this principle may apply the act must have been authorized:
(1) by the law as distinguished from officers of the law.2 s
(2) by the law of the proper state or country. 29
The definition of a crime as an act prohibited by law has been criticized
from both a sociological- and a legal standpoint. It has been contended that
this definition, though adequate in those states in which there is no common
law, is inaccurate in states in which the common law exists. The common
law, it is said, determines "from the reason of the thing" whether an act is
a crime and therefore the definition tnder discussion is a petitio principii.
it being equivalent to saying that an act is a crime because it is forbidden by
law and that it is forbidden by law because it is a crime."
In reply to this criticism it has been said: "The common law does pro-
hibit. To say otherwise would be to say that the common law makes an act
punishable which was not against the law when it was committed, and no
civilized nation would punish such acts ........ There are acts it is
true, which may never have been committed (and which are not prohibited
by statute), but, which, when they are committed, may be punished. They
will not be punished, however, unless they violate the general principles of
the common law, and unless they are mala in se or wrong in themselves."2
Aversion to retroactive law should not be beguiled by a resort to fiction.
The law in general should operate only on future conduct, or as lawyers state
it, prospectively and not retroactively. This requirement is fully recognized
in the case of statutory law," Courts, however, have the power to make new
rules of the common law even in criminal cases, and all new rules of law
-6Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binney (Pa.) 546.
27Danville Co. v. C., 73 Pa. 29.
28C. v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 38.
29Reg. v. Leslie, 8 Cox 371; 16 C. J, p, 73; 16 C. J. p. 149.
SOParsons, Crime and the Criminal, p. 151. See infra.
3 'Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th ed., p. 18.
S2Clark, Criminal Law, 3rd. ed., p. 24.
3SKinnane, Anglo-American Law, p. 97.
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made by the courts operate retroactively, for judicial decisions are rendered
with reference to past conduct A
4
This fact does not produce great injustice, and no serious effort has been
u. ade to abolish the retroactivity of court made laws. All decisions do not
operate retroactively but only those in which new law is made, and such
decisions, in criminal cases, are comparatively rare.?5 Furthermore, in reality,
in most cases the application of the law for the laity, is all ex post facto. A
man who enters into a partnership, or buys a piece of land, or engages in
any other transaction usually has the vaguest possible idea of the law govern-
ing the situation, and law of which a man has no knowledge is the same to
him as if it did not exist.36
CHARACTER OF PROHIBITION
An act may be prohibited and made criminal by (1) the law of the state,
in which case it is a crime against the state, and the perpetrator is prosecuted
in the state courts and punished by the state; or (2) the federal law, in
which case it is a crime against the nation, and the perpetrator is prosecuted
in the federal courts and punished by the federal government A
The same act may be made criminal by both state and federal law, and
for the commission of such an act the perpetrator may be prosecuted and
punished both by the state and the federal governments.' 8 "An act denounc-
ed as a crime by both national and state sovereignities is an offense against
both and may be punished by each.-'-" This doctrine is based upon the assump-
tion that the breaking of both national and state criminal law gives rise to
two distinct crimes rather than to concurrent jurisdiction over the same crim-
inal act. In the leading case the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"Here the same act was an offense against the State of Washington, because
a violation of its law and also an offense against the United States under
the National Prohibition Act. The defendant thus committed two different
crimes by the same act and a conviction by a court of Washington of an of-
fense against that state is not a conviction of the different offense against the
United States and so is not double 4eopardy.40 This doctrine has been
criticised as being historically, analytically and functionally unsound. 1
-4Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, p. 96.
35Report, Crimes Survey Commission, p. 22.
56Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, p. 100.
37U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dal]. (U. S.) 384.
3SRump v. C., 30 Pa. 475; Compare C. v. Ketner, 92 Pa. 372.
39U. S. v. Lanza. 43 Sup. Ct. Rpt. 142.
40U. S. v, Lanza, supra; Dobie. Federal Procedure, p. 51.
4132 Columbia Law Review, p. 1309.
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STATE CRIMES
Acts are made crimes against the state either by (I) legislation or (2)
judicial decision. The legislative law of a state includes (1) its constitution,
(2) the statutes enacted by its legislature, and (3) the ordinances enacted
by its municipalities. 4 2 There are no acts which are made criminal by the
Constitution of Pennsylvania." :
The law of crimes in Pennsylvania, it is said, "is nearly all statutory.4 4
This statement, subject to important qualifications,', is true of Pennsylvania
and the other states. "The Amerian criminal law in general has proceeded
to a point where it puts most of its emphasis on statutes. -
4
6
The law which is made by the courts is called the common law, and acts
made criminal by judicial decisions are called common law crimes. Not-
withstanding the alleged comprehensiveness of the present statutory law as
to crimes, common law crimes still exist in Pennsylvania .4  The so-called
Criminal Code of Pennsylvania provides: "Every felony, misdemeanor, or
offense whatever not specially provided for by this act, may and shall be
punished as heretofore,"I s and that: "In all cases where a remedy is pro-
vided, or duty enjoined, or anything directed to be done by an act or acts of
assembly of this Commonwealth the directions of the said acts shall be
strictly pursued; and no penalty shall be inflicted or anything done agreeable
to the provisions of the common law in such cases, further than shall be
necessary for carrying such acts into effect. ' 4" The effect of these provisions
is to leave the common law of crimes in operation, n° except where it has been
supplied by the statutory law. 1  "But for the most part." it has been said, "'it
has been so supplied and the scope left for the operation of the common law
is very limited.
' '
12
The courts, moreover, still have the power, in absence of precedent or
statute, to make acts criminal by judicial decision,. 53 "but the occasions when
4-Kinnane, Anglo-American Law, p. 50.
43The United States Constitution defines treason against the United States.
44Report, Crimes Survey Commission, p. 36.
4-.The nature of these qualifications will be discussed later.
418 Cornell Law Quarterly, p. 524.
47C. v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 482: James v. C., 12 S, E R. (Pa.) 220; C. v. Brown,
23 Pa. Super. Ct., 470.
48Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382 sec. 178.
49Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382 sec. 183.
50C. v. Mohn, 52 Pa. 243.
51C. v. Railing, 113 Pa. 110.
5Report, Crimes Survey Commission, p. 37. But see supra.
5 31d.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the power can properly be exercised are rare, and in the main the Legislature
must now be relied upon for the proper development of the criminal law.""
The statutory law leaves "very few crimes unprovided for.' '
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
A municipal corporation has no inherent power to pass police regula-
tions." The legislature may, however, empower the authorities of a muni-
cipality to make such rules and regulations as they shall deem necessary for
the good order of the community, and to prescribe penalties for the violations
of such rules and regulations, provided they do not contravene the laws or
constitution of the state or of the United States. The ordinances enacted
by the municipality must be a reasonable exercise of the power conferred by
the legislature."
Ordinances enacted by a municipality within the scope of its delegated
power are just as much laws of the State as are statutes. 8  But violations of
municipal ordinances are not generally crimes.!9 The penalty prescribed for
the violation of an ordinance is enforced in a civil action.- The statute
authorizing a municipal ordinance may, however, expressly provide that a
violation of an ordinance shall be a crime.'
Municipalities may be empowered, expressly or by necessary implica-
tion, to prohibit and punish acts which are made crimes by the statutory or
common law of the state."1"  In such cases, as the violation of the ordinance
does not constitute a crime, the violator may be punished for both violating
the ordinance and for committing the crime, without violating constitutional
provisions against double jeopardy or the common law principle of autre fois
convict. 2
EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS
A violation of the rules and regulations prescribed by a government of-
ficer or department is not per se a crime.6 3 Such officers cannot, unless auth-
orized by statute, make that a crime which was not a crime by common law
54Report, Crimes Survey Commission p. 22.
5 ld. p. 36.
-In Re P. R. R. Co., 213 Pa. 373; 43 C. J. p. 205; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 140.
5 7C. v. Shafer, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 497; 43 C. J. p. 206.
IsBurton v. Erie County, 206 Pa. 570.
SoTrickett. Boroughs, p. 142; Sadler, Criminal Procedure p. 539; Mahanoy City v. Wad-
linger, 142 Pa. 308; 43 C. 1. 446.
6(ld.
6IC. v. Shafer, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 497.
6ia43 C. J. p. 222; Morgan v..C., 30 P. L. J. 14.
6243 C. J. p. 222; Clark & Marshall, Crimes, 3rd. ed. p. 2.
63U. S. v. Keitel, 157 Fed. 396; 16 C. J. p. 62.
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or statute."' Moreover, Congress or the legislature cannot confer upon
executive officers or departments the power to define crimes or classify of-
fenders or prescribe penalties for the violation of executive regulations.1
5
But Congress or the legislature may delegate to officers or departments the
power to determine the facts or things upon which the operation of the law
depends.61 Congress or the legislature may confer upon the executive of-
ficers or departments the power to make rules and regulations and may pre-
scribe that violations of such rules and regulations shall constitute crimes."
Statutes conferring upon private organizations the power to make rules
and regulations and prescribing that violations thereof shall constitute crimes
have usually been held to be unconstitutional.- But such a statute was held
to be constitutional in Gima v. Hudson Coal Co.60 The statute provided that
those firing high explosives should comply with the rules prescribed by the
manufacturer and made a violation of such rules a misdemeanor. The case
was one involving public safety and perhaps greater latitude in the delega-
tion of its power should be accorded to the legislature in such cases. The
delegated power would probably be held to authorize only reasonable regu-
lations; but confusion is very likely to result from lack of uniformity in the
rules prescribed by different manufacturers for similar products. The legis-
lature may need relief from the burden of setting up detailed regulations, but
the delegation to private individuals of the power to define crimes seems to
be unfortunate.
DUAL CRIMES
An act may be prohibited and made criminal by more than one law of
the state. "There are many instances, in the statutes, of offenses for which
the perpetrator may be indicted unden more than one act of assembly, leav-
ing the choice to the district attorney as to which one he shall use.'"T
FEDERAL CRIMES
Acts are made crimes against the United States only by the statutory
law. There are no crimes against the United States save those acts which
are made criminal by act of Congress. Unless, therefore, an act is made
criminal by a federal statute, that act, however vicious or offensive its char-
64U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 667.
65U. S. v. Pounds of Butter, 195 Fed. 657.
66Lock's App., 72 Pa. 49.
6TC. v. Shafer, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 497; U. S. v. Keitel, 157 Fed. 396; Gray, Nature and
Sources of Law, p. 153.
6846 Harvard Law Review 329.
69106 Pa. Super. Ct. 288.
70C. v. O'Brien, 107 Pa. Super. Ct. 569, 574.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
acter, is not a crime against the United States. There are therefore no
common law crimes against the United States.- In making acts criminal
Congress frequently employs the terminology of the common law, and in
such cases recourse must be had to the common law for interpreting the con-
gressional language.-2 But in such cases Congress creates the offense.
The doctrine that there are no common law crimes against the United
States is said to be due to the fact that the United States is a government
of delegated powers. It has no powers except those expressly or impliedly
given to it by the United States Constitution."
The Constitution contains a few express grants of power to punish
crime;T and the United States has the implied power to make criminal the
violation of any law which it has the constitutional power tol pass.
7 5
The field of federal crimes is therefore potentially coextensive with the
scope of federal institutions; but the great majority of crimes committed
within the geographical limits of the United States are state crimes.
Many of the statutes defining crimes against the United States were
codified by Congress in a code which became effective on January 1st, 1910.71
The steady expansion of the activities of the federal government, the modern
passion for controlling personal conduct by legislation, the World War, the
Eighteenth Amendment, and the depression. together with many other fac-
tors. have led, since the adoption of this code, to the enactment of other
criminal laws "as numerous as, and many much less useful than, the storied
leaves that were supposed to strew the brooks of Vallambrosa.
' '
77
TIME OF PROHIBITION
In order that an act may be punished as a crime, it must be prohibited
by law both at the time it is committed and at the time of the final judgment
against the criminal.-r If, therefore, a law making an act a crime is repealed
71U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32; U. S. v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199; U. S. v, Eaton, 144
U. S. 677; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240.
72This section 27S of the Penal Code (18 U. S. C. A. sec. 457) declares "rape" to be a
crime when committed in certain places subject to federal jurisdiction. The common law
must be used to supply the definition of "rape". Matter of Lane, 135 U. S. 443. See Wil-
liams, Federal Procedure, p. 300.
73Williams, Federal Procedure, p. 299; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Ct'anch 32.
74Counterfeiting, piracy, felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations,
and treason.
"7Williams. Federal Procedure, p. 299.
"6Act of March 4. 1909. Title 18, United States Code Annotated.
77A list of general penal provisions not contained in the Code follows section 536 of
title 18, United States Code Annotated, pages 407-429.
78Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 3rd ed. p. 17; C. v. Toogood, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 282; Scranton
v. Rose. 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 458; C. v. Beattie, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 404.
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after the act is committed, the actor cannot be punished for it.7
This is true even though when the repeal occurs a prosecution is pend-
ing, or after a conviction, and before sentence, or after sentence pending an
appeal to a higher court.-0 A repeal after a final judgment will, however,
neither vacate the judgment nor arrest the execution of the sentence.- '
The rule is subject to real or apparent exceptions:
(1) Where there is a saving clause in the repealing law authorizing
prosecution after repeal for acts committed previous to the repealA2"
(2) Where there is a general statute or constitutional provision, apply-
ing to all laws which repeal former laws either expressly or by implication,
and providing that the repeal of a statute shall not affect the right to prose-
cute for acts committed while the statute was in forceY
(3) Where a statute is repealed, even expressly, and all, or some, of its
provisions are at the same time literally or substantially reenacted, the pro-
visions of the repealed act which are thus reenacted continue in force with-
out interruption so as to permit prosecutions for acts committed prior to the
repeal. 84
(4) Where a statute indicates very clearly that its provisions are to apply
only to offenses thereafter committed, the effect is the same as that of a
saving clause in the repealing act or of a general statute providing that repeal
shall not affect prosecutions for offenses committed while the statute was in
force.5
The mere fact than an act is prohibited by law does not make it a crime.
There is something more in the notion of crime than a mere breach of a legal
rule. An act which is prohibited by law may be only a civil injury, e, g._ a
tort, or a breach of contract, or a quasi contractual or equitable obligation.
It is, therefore, inaccurate to define a crime simply as an act prohibited by
law, and this inaccuracy is not relieved by substituting as Blackstone does,
the term "public law" for "law," for the term public law is itself incapable
of precise definition. 6
79C. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Dist. 117; C. v. Dolan, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 287; C. v. McNamara, 93 Pa.
Super. Ct. 267.
SOC. v. Duane, 1 Binney (Pa.) 601.
81 In Re Kline, 77 Oh. St. 25, 70 N. E. 511, 1 Ann. Cas. 219.
8216 C. J. p. 721; C. v. McNamara, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 267; C. v. Beattie, 93 Pa. Super.
Ct, 404; C. v. Barnard, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 403.
saId.
841d.
65C. v. Beattie, Sed quere.
86Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th ed. p. 3; In Re Clifford (1921) 2 A. C. 570.
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PUNISHMENT
An act, in order to be a crime, in addition to being prohibited by law,
must subject the actor to liability to punishment and not merely to a legal
duty of reparation or restitution. The definitions of crime, however they
may differ in other respects, nearly all contain this element. "A crime always
involves punishment."s Applying 'this rule it has been held that sui-
cide is not a crime. "As there is no punishment, there is no crime.",8
The idea of punishment as an essential element of crime has been so em-
phasized that it has been said that, "the only tolerably certain test of crime
is; Does the conduct complained of render the offender liable to punish-
ment?"' ' 9 and that "the distinction between a civil and criminal proceeding is
whether the real end or object of the proceeding is punishment or repara-
tion."9o
It is doubtless true that a distinguishing mark, par excellence, of a crime
is that it involves liability to punishment. But it is no more than a distin-
guishing mark. It does not explain the thing itself.' Although punitive-
ness or nonpunitiveness is a simple and obvious test by which to determine
in many cases whether an act is a crime, it is not an absolute test.
92 There
are acts which are not crimes which are nevertheless punishable. Three
classes of such acts are:
(1) Acts for which punitive damages may be recovered in a civil ac-
tion.
(2) Acts for which a penalty may be recovered in a civil action.
(3) Acts which violate injunctions.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
There exists a large class of ordinary civil cases in which punitive dam-
ages may be recovered. Punitive dama-ges are damages imposed for the
purpose of punishing the defendant. They are given in addition to the dam-
ages which are given for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff, which
87Winfleld, The Law of Tort, p. 196; Salmond Jurisprudence, p. 116; Holdsworth, His-
tory of English Law, vol. 2, p. 453. "The only common feature that crimes will be found to
possess is that they are prohibited by the state and those who commit them are punished."
Proprietary Ass'n. v. A. G. (1931) A. C. 324. For the purpose of punishment, see C. v.
Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 385. For a definition of punishment, see Winfield, The Law of Tort,
p. 198.
89C. v. Wright, 11 Pa. Dist. Rep. 144. Compare C. v. Wilkins, 271 Pa. 523.
89Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 200.
00ernigan v. C. 104 Va. 850, 52 S. E. 361.
9'Allen, Legal Duties, p. 233.
92Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 1, p. 1.
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are called compensatory damages.- The practice of awarding punitive dam-
ages in certain civil cases is centuries old and is now followed in all but a
few states. The doctrine, however, has been denounced as an anomaly and
criticized on the ground that punishment is not a proper object of the civil
law .
9 4
Among the states in which the doctrine of punitive damages is recognized,
there is a conflict of opinion as to whether punitive damages may be recov-
ered in a civil case for an act which is also a crime.05 The majority of juris-
dictions, including Pennsylvania, hold that the fact that the act for which
punitive damages are sought in a civil action is also a crime does not pre-
clude a recovery of -such damages.96 There may be a recovery of punitive
damages although the defendant has been convicted in a criminal prosecution
for the same act;97 and the fact that in a civil action a person has been com-
pelled to pay punitive damages is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the
same act. " In jurisdictions in which this doctrine prevails there is need for
a reciprocal adjustment of the penalties of the criminal and civil courts. If
the defendant has been convicted in the criminal courts before the civil ac-
tion takes place, it is held that the record showing his conviction and sen-
tence may be offered in evidence and considered by the jury in mitigation
of damages. 9 The actual effect of the introduction of such evidence is
doubtful. The jury instead of using the information to adjust downward the
penalty which the defendant should pay, may be persuaded by it that the de-
fendant is guilty and deserving of heavier punitive damages. If the civil
trial comes first, the jury does not know for certain that a criminal prosecu-
tion will be brought, nor does it know that the defendant will be convicted if
prosecuted. In such cases the jury should assess the damages without regard
to the possibility of punishment in a criminal court, and if a criminal prose-
cution is subsequently brought the adjustment should be made there. The
judge of the criminal court can make such adjustment easily by imposing a
minimum sentence or by suspending sentence if the evidence warrants it.
PENAL ACTIONS
A penal action is an action to recover a penalty provided by statute.1
There are many such statutes in Pennsylvania. The purpose of such actions
9317 C. J. 719.
94For an excellent discussion. see 44 Harvard Law Review, p. 1173.
9517 C. J. 981.
96Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 15.
07d.
9sFoster v. C., 8 W. F5 S. 77.
9OWirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 115.
11 C. J. 932.
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is punishment.2 The law imposes the penalties from precisely the same mo-
tives which lead it to send thieves to jail or murderers to the electric chair.
But the litigation by which such penalties are enforced is not regarded as
criminal, and the acts which are so punished are not regarded as crimes,
even though such acts are prohibited and penalized solely because of their
tendency to injure the public.3
It has been said that "penal actions are in form civil but in substance
criminal" because they are intended to produce punishment and not repara-
tion.4 Certainly their anomalous character complicates very artificially the
distinction between the criminal and the civil law-between acts which are
crimes and acts which are merely civil injuries. They have been stigmatized
as "freaks," "hybrids" and "anomalies", which frustrate attempts to dis-
tinguish crimes from civil injuries.-
The origin of these actions was due to historical causes. The present
advantage of such a form of procedure is that it may be used by the legisla-
ture to penalize a minor offense in a summary civil proceeding before a magis-
trate even though the offense may have been indictable prior to the adoption
of the state constitution and therefore, not punishable in a summary criminal
proceeding.3 The disadvantages are that the legislature cannot provide for
the imprisonment of the guilty person, except on civil process to enforce the
payment of the pecuniary judgment, and that the convicted defendant has
the unqualified right to appeal upon the payment of costs, instead of the
right qualified by the necessity of obtaining the allowance of the appeal by
the appellate court, as in a summary criminal proceeding, and also that there
is no adequate method of enforcing the judgment against an insolvent de-
fendant. 7
Penal actions are of various kinds: (I) Those which are brought in
the name of the person who was injured by the act for which the penalty
was imposed. In these cases it is not necessary that the penalty be con-
fined or proportioned to the loss or damage caused to the plaintiff, as it is
imposed for the purpose of punishment and not for the purpose of redressing
a private injury." (2) Those which are brought in the name of any person
who chooses to sue for the penalty. Statutes providing for such actions have
been in existence in this country ever since the founding of our government. 9
2Bergner v. Koenig, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 618.
3P. R. R. v. Ewing. 241 Pa. 581; 25 C. J. 1181; Kenny. Criminal Law, 14th ed., p. 7; Har-
ris, Criminal Law, 15th ed.. p. 2.
'42 Harvard Law Review. p. 574.
5Geldart. Elments of English Law. p. 237: Allen, Legal Duties, p. 226.
6Mountain v. C., 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 100.
7Report, Crimes Survey Commission, p. 9.
eSt. Louis R. R. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63; Bergner v. Koenig, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 618.
9Central R. R. v. Green, 86 Pa. 427. /
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
(3) Those which are brought in the name of the Commonwealth." Actions
of this class are said to be governed by many of the principles applicable to
summary convictions for crime.1 The latter two classes of penal actions dif-
fer from actions in which punitive damages may be recovered by the fact
that the latter may be brought only by the injured party.
t 2
The legislature may provide that a penal action and a prosecution may
be brought for the same act. "Many statutes have been enacted by our
legislature which provide that a person violating their provisions shall be
liable to a penalty to be recovered in a civil action ...... .and shall
also be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be fined or imprisoned.
We know of no Pennsylvania decision in which it is held that such legisla-
tion offends against any provision of our constitution. This is not punish-
ing the same offense twice. The penalty recovered in the civil action and
fine and imprisonment imposed in the criminal prosecution are but parts of
one punishment."", Sometimes the legislature provides that a penal action
and a prosecution shall be alternative remedies.'4 The fact that the law pro-
vides that the injured person may recover a penalty in a civil action does
not necessarily preclude him from also recovering damages for the injury
which he suffered.' 5
VIOLATIONS OF INJUNCTIONS
Civil courts, sitting as courts of equity, in certain cases issue decrees,
called injunctions, ordering the defendant to do or to refrain from doing cer-
tain acts. A violation of such a decree is called a contempt of court, and
one guilty thereof may be fined or imprisoned by the court. Contempt in-
volves not only an infringement of the private rights of the plaintiff in the
injunction suit but also a flouting of the court's authority. Proceedings for
contempt may, therefore, seek indemnity for disobedience or a vindication of
the court. This dual aspect of contempt has led to a classification of contempt
as (1) civil and (2) criminal.
The distinction "rests in shadow,"16 and has led to much opaque discus-
sion, but it is recognized in Pennsylvania. In Patterson u. Wyoming Council, '
the court said: "From the earliest days of our legal history contempts
of court and proceedings to ascertain them have been divided into two broad
10C. v. Hudnick, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 176.
"1C. v. Hudnick, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 176: C. v. Betts. 76 Pa. 465.
I2Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 174.
"3C. v. Diefenbacher, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 264; 25 C. J. 1170.
"4See act of July 2. 1839, P. L. 519.
15Hibbert, Jurisprudence. p. 174.
'sRoot v. McDonald, 260 Mass. 358.
L731 Pa. Super. Ct. 112.
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and easily distinguishable classes. Where the alleged contemptuous act is
aimed directly at the power or dignity of the court, or subversive of the ad-
ministration of public law; and where the responsive act of the court is
purely punitive in character, to vindicate the rights of the people at large
vested in their properly constituted legal tribunals, such contempts, and the
proceedings to ascertain and punish them, have always been regarded as es-
sentially criminal-as distinguished from civil-in their character. But where
the act complained of consists merely in the refusal to do or refrain from
doing some act commanded or prohibited for the benefit, primarily at least,
of a party litigant, proceedings to ascertain such contempts and enforce obedi-
ence to the order or decree, have ever been deemed akin to execution process
and civil, rather than criminal in their nature.'"'1
It has been truly said that the granting of an injunction "is in some re-
spects analogous to the publication of a criminal statute. It is notice to a
party that certain things must be done or not done under a penalty fixed by
the court, "'1 and the sentence of the court looks very much like punishment.
It has, however, been naively stated; "It is not the fact of punishment
but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between
the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt, the punishment is
remedial and for the benefit of the complainant. ' -20 On the other hand, though
it is held that in the so-called criminal contempts "the sentence is punitive,"'21
it is nevertheless true that proceedings for such contempts "are not hedged
about with all the safeguards provided in the bill of rights for protecting one
accused of ordinary crime." -2 The truth seems to be that contempt proceed-
ings of either class are sui generis and are not truly criminal proceedings and
contempts of either character are not crimes in the ordinary sense of the
term.
2
1
Although a court of equity will not enjoin an act simply because it is
a crime. it is well settled that where an injunction is otherwise warranted
by the principles of equity to protect the rights of another, the mere fact
that a criminal act must be enjoined to affect such protection will not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction. The criminality of the act sought to be enjoined
neither gives nor divests jurisdiction.25 The advantage of securing from
18See also Westmoreland Co. v. United Mine Workers, I West. (Pa.) 3.
loSullivan v. Jones, 222 Pa. 72.
2"Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874. See also West-
moreland Co. v, United Mine Workers, I West. (Pa.) 3. For distinction between coercive and
punitive imprisonment, see Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 198.
21Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., Supra.
22In Re Grossman, 267 U. S. 87.
23See Harris, Criminal Law, 15th ed. p. 3.'
24C. v. Smith, 270 Pa. 511.
24Sparhawk v. R. R.. 54 Pa. 401.
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equity injunctions against crime were formerly very great. The prohibitions
of the criminal law are general and each man is left to apply it to himself.
The prohibition of an injunction is addressed directly to an individual. The
punishments for crime are generally fixed by law. The punishment for dis-
obedience to an injunction was in the discretion of the court. For a viola-
tion of the criminal law, punishment is imposed only after plenary proceed-
ings. The charge of violating an injunction was disposed of in a summary
proceeding. By the device of having a court determine the particular acts
which constitute the offense, and having the person likely to commit the of-
fense enjoined, the charge of subsequent guilt could be disposed of summarily,
without preliminary hearing, indictment by grand jury, or trial by jury. These
advantages led to a gradual but persistent and continual enlargement of the
power of the courts of equity to grant injunctions and to a movement to ex-
tend this most effective of the preventitive remedies developed in the past on
the civil side of the law.
2 6
It has been held that the fact that a person has been punished for con-
tempt for violating an injunction by doing an act which is also a crime is not
a bar to a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same act. 27 It, therefore,
appears that many acts which have been penalized by one organ of the gov-
ernment, the legislature, may be penalized again by another organ of it, the
courts. A little ingenuity in the formation of governmental contrivances
might make it possible for a man to be punished three or four times for the
same act, because three or four public functionaries have concurred in forbid-
ding it. In justification it has been said that an injunction prevents and this
differs from the criminal law which punishes. An injunction prevents simply
by creating a desire on the part of the defendant to do or not to do. the act
commanded or forbidden by it. It creates thi. desire by a threat of evil con-
sequences to him who disobeys. An injunction prevents, then, only as the
criminal law prevents, because punishment will follow disobcdience2,
PROSECUTION
In order that an act may be a crime it must not only be prohibited and
made punishable by law but it must subject the actor to liability to prosecu-
tion. "The distinction (between crimes and civil injuries) is between wrongs
2 6These advantages have been to some extent abolished. See act of June 23, 1931, P.
L. 925; and act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 926.
2 7
1n Re Debs, 165 U. S. 564; Walsh, Ecuitv, n. 207: Foster v. C., 8 W. & S. 77.
2
8
1n Pennsylvania there are statutes conferring this so-called preventive procedure upon
other courts in certain cases. C. v. Andrews, 211 Pa. 110. An effort has been made to rec-
oncile the apparent exceptions, which have just been discussed, with the statement that the
only safe test of crime is the fact that it renders the offender liable to punishment by giving
a particular definition to the term punishment. Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 199.
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to be redressed by private suit and those the perpetrator of which may be
proceeded against by prosecution. "2' A prosecution is a judicial proceeding
in the name of the state, but every judicial proceeding in the name of the
state is not a prosecution. The fact that an act renders the actor liable to be
proceeded against in the name of the state is therefore not decisive of its
criminal character. "The distinction between criminal and civil proceed-
ings is not whether the crown is a party for it is so in mandamus and quo
warranto."31, This is true, as the previous discussion of penal actions dem-
onstrates, even though the act is prohibited and made punishable by law
solely upon the qround that it injures the public and the penalty is recovered
in an action in the name of the State."
An act to be a crime must render the actor liable to be proceeded against
in a certain kind of proceeding in the name of the state, to wit, a prosecu-
tion.3 2 The kinds of prosecution in use in Pennsylvania are: (1) prosecu-
tions by information and (2) prosecutions by indictment.
33
It has been said that the best test whether an act is a crime is whether
it renders one subject to a prosecution 34 This is not, however, an absolute
test. By statute in some states prosecutions by indictment or information
may be maintained to redress certain civil injuries and not for the purpose of
imposing punishment.3 5 But these cases are exceptional and few in number,
and, in general, it may be said that "where an act is interdicted and made
punishable by law, the test by which to determine whether an act is a crime
is whether the punishment is in an action or a prosecution. If in the latter
it is criminal. If in the former the act is not criminal."36
It must be remembered, however, that although a prosecution is a judi-
cial proceeding in the name of the state any person has a right to institute
it.5 7 "Even where a state officer or bureau has been specifically charged
with the enforcement of a statute, we have frequently held that such direc-
tion did not deprive any citizen of the riqht to institute prosecutions for its
violation."'s In these cases the private prosecutor is simply a complainant or
informant, and altho the state may permit him to start the machinery of the
29C. v. Flaherty, 29 Pa. Co. Ct., 238; Harris, Criminal Law, 15th ed., p. 2.
3nJerniqan v, C., 104 Va. 858.
31See P. R. R. v. Ewing. 241 Pa. 581,
32See Harper v. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128.
a3Report, Crimes Survey Commission, p. 6; C. v. Cook, 55 Pa. Super. Ct., 435.
84Clark, Criminal Law, p. 17.
3517 Cyc. 1254.
36Bishop. Criminal Law, sec. 32. "A crime is an act which may be the subject of crim-
inal proceedings instituted for the punishment of the offender," Harris, Criminal Law, 15th
ed.. p. 1.
8716 C. J. 289.
86C. v. Crowl, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 539; C. v. Barr, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 609.
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criminal law, it retains control of the machinery. The private prosecutor
has no right to demand the punishment of the offender and the state may in
various ways stop the machincry 0  In the case of civil injuries, on the con-
trary, in general, it may be said to be true that there is no power which can
prevent a plaintiff from suing when he has a reasonable claim.
4
0
Definitions are always difficult and should as far as practicable be avoid-
ed. Perhaps the worst form of unscientific definition is one which states the
results to which the thing which is being defined gives rise instead of stating
the intrinsic nature of the thing and the elements which compose it.4- The
orthodox definitions of crime are of this character. They define a crime by
stating.what the legal consequences of committing one are. They are purely
technical and amount merely to a distinction between civil and criminal pro-
cedure and say "a crime is an act which gives rise to that kind of procedure
which is styled criminal." The legal definitions of crime give no indication
why particular acts are designated crimes; why two such dissimilar acts as
parking 35 minutes, when a statute makes 30 minutes the limit, and a brutal
murder are both crimes; why it is necessary to make criminal certain types
of conduct; while other acts are only civil injuries.
42
Some authorities have attempted to discover distinctive peculiarities in
the intrinsic nature of crime by which they may be distinguished from other
acts. Two such peculiarities have been suggested; (1) crimes injure the
public; (2) crimes are immoral acts. But, as will presently appear, it is now
quite universally admitted that there is no essential intrinsic difference be-
tween acts which are crimes and those which are not,
43
It is, therefore, necessary, in defining a crime, to resort to an extrinsic
test and to adopt the unscientific method of defining it by stating the legal
consequences which follow its commission.
3gAllen, Legal Duties, p. 227.
40As to injunction against civil and criminal proceedings, see 32 C. J. p. 84. 279. As to
the destruction or impairment of rights of action by legislature. see 12 C. J. 972: Austin, Juris-
prudence, Lecture XXVII.
41"The consequences charged upon an act by law and not the nature of the act itself
is the specific difference by which crimes are distinguished." Stephen. General View, p. 2.
42Wickersham Report, No. 13, p. 5: Allen, Legal Duties, p. 221. 233.
43Austin, Jurisprudence. Lecture XXVII. "There are no certain and universal qualities
which at once stamp an act with the character of a crime," Harris, Criminal Law, p. 2.
"Nothing in the character of an act enables us to determine whether it is a criminal offense.
The only test is the nature of the liability it entails. In particular, neither the moral charac-
ter of an act nor the amnotit of public mischief it may cause can distinguish it from a civil
injury or make it a criminal offense." Harris, Criminal Law, p. 4. "Any description of
crime which centres either in procedure or in the fact of punishment amounts only to a formal,
not to a material definition." Allen, Legal Duties, p. 233.
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PUBLIC INJURY
The books are full of statements to the effect that crimes injure the pub-
lic, and in order that an act may be a crime it must be "a public wrong" or
be "injurious to the public.-- In ascertaining the correctness of these state-
ments, common law crimes must be distinguished from statutory crimes.
The theory of the common law was that a crime was a "wrong committed
against the public."" 5 It is quite true that before the definitions of common
law crimes had become crystalized, injury to the public was the test usually,
or at least frequently, applied in determining whether an act was a crime;
and this test is frequently applied in determining whether certain acts fall
within certain common law definitions, e. g., nuisance and conspiracy. But
it is conceded, that even at common law, the act might affect the public either
directly, as in case of nuisance, or indirectly, as in case of murder.40 And
the correct doctrine undoubtedly is that, even at common law, it was not true
that every crime caused injury to the public in any real sense of the word
and that the presence or absence of injury to the public did not constitute an
infallible test by which to distinguish crimes from other unlawful acts. This
is proved by the following facts:
Some common law crimes are purely private wrongs to individuals alone,
Thus nothing could be more purely a private wrong than a simple larceny
where there is no breach of the peace, no loss of property since it simply
changes hands, no open immorality corrupting the minds of the young, no
person injured but him who takes and him who loses.
Some acts which injure the public are not common law crimes. A person
without committing a common law crime may bring about a public calamity
incomparably more widespread and severe than that produced by many
common law crimes, as e. g.. by the negligent management of a bank.1
An act may be criminal at commcn law even though instead of being in-
jurious to the public it is, on the whole, beneficial, as where a defendant was
held guilty of a nuisance for erecting a causeway which to some extent ob-
structed navigation though by reason of facilitating the handling of goods
and passengers it produced advantages which were considered by the jury
to more than counterbalance the harm done.4s
4"See C. v. Randolph. 146 Pa. 24: C. v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 405. This, it is
said, is the "simple common sense of matter and the accepted view of the English law." Allen,
Legal Duties, p. 284. "This is the traditional view of the English law and is justified by the
early history of the criminal law." Keeton, Jurisprudence, p. 192.
4631 Yale Law journal, p. 241.
4631 Yale Law Journal, p. 241.
47See Allen, Legal Duties, p. 235; Salmond, jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 119.
48R. v. Ward. 4 A. & E. 384.
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The legislature in determining whether an act should be made criminal
has not been compelled to follow and has not even pretended to follow the
principle that in order that an act may be a crime it must injure the public.
Apart from constitutional restrictions, it is bound by no precedents and gov-
erned by no principles. It may make and has made criminal, acts which
possess none of the alleged qualities of common law crime and which the
public has never regarded as criminal or wrong. It has made many acts
criminal though the injury resulting therefrom was solely to an individual and
even trifling and insignificant. It has been held, however, that where a
statute prohibits any matter of public grievance or commands a matter of
public convenience, although a violation of the statute is not expressly de-
clared to be a crime and no penalty is provided for it, a violation of the statute
constitutes a crime. 49
It appears, therefore, that "we cannot say, with anything like that un-
varying precision which a definition requires that a legal wrong is a crime
if it tends to cause evil to the community,"" and injury to the public is "too
nebulous" a test "to be incorporated into a definition of crime."' " "To speak of
crimes as those forms of legal wrong which are regarded by the law as being es-
pecially injurious to the public at large, may be an instructive general descrip-
tion of them, but is not an accurate definition."512 A recent writer has stated
that crime "is no longer an injury directed primarily against the security of
the State, but any undesirable act which the State finds it most convenient to
correct by the institution of proceedings for the infliction of a penalty instead
of leaving the remedy to the discretion of some injured person."5 3
In reality crimes are of two kinds: (1) Those which primarily injure
rights of specific persons, and secondarly injure the public; (2) Those which
directly injure the public interest represented by various factors of the social
organization, and do not injure specific individuals at all, except in the very
remote and indeterminate sense that ultimately every individual is a joint
beneficiary in the public interest.1
4
4916 C. J. 69; Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 199.
*OKenny, Criminal Law, p. 6.
6'Winfleld, The Law of Tort, p. 187, 200. "It cannot be accepted as sufficient founda-
tion for the precise accuracy necessary in a formal definition." Kenny, p. 5.
52Kenny, Criminal Law, p. 8. "While the tendency of a wrong to injure the public is
a factor by no means to be ignored in considering the criminality of such wrong, it is too
vague to rest the whole weight of the definition of crime upon it." Winfield, The Law of
Tort, p. 197.
"3Keeton, Jurisprudence, p. 193.
54Robinson, Elementary Law, p. 522; Allen, Legal Duties, p. 249; Holland, Jurispru-
dence, 9th ed., p. 361; Mercier. Crime and Insanity, p. 90. "In modem times the latter greatly
outnumber the former." Allen, Legal Duties, p. 90.
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MORALITY
It is sometimes asserted that crimes are limited to acts which offend our
moral sentiments. in popular speeh this is true. but in a legal sense it is in-
correct. Crime and immorality are not convertible terms, and there is a
marked difference of opinion as to the degree of correspondence between
them. On the one hand it has been said that "the moral nature of an act is
an element of no value in determining whether it is criminal or not" and that
"numerically considered only a minority of crimes have any ethical signifi-
cance whatever.' ' On the other hand, it has been asserted that "in general
the prohibitions of the criminal law correspond with the moral sense of the
community, and, with few exceptions, crimes are acts from which every man
knows he ought to refrain." '
It is certainly true that an act may be immoral but not a crime. "A very
great number of the most despicable, wicked, and harmful deeds that can be
committed are not crimes at all."- 1 This was particularly true of the com-
mon law. Morality in England was encouraged and vindicated by the eccle-
siastical courts, and the common law courts urdinarily left offenses against
morality for consideration and punishment by them." In the United States,
though there were no ecclesiastical courts, and the reason for the common law
doctrine did not exist, the doctrine has nevertheless been generally followed.'9
It is also true that an act may be criminal but not immoral. Indeed, "it
is conceivable that the only really morally right tiing to do under certain
circumstances would be to commit an act designated by law as a crime."' 0
Notwithstanding these facts it may perhaps be truthfully said that. "it
is, in the last analysis. underlying ethical concepts which shape and give di-
rection to the growth of the criminal law." and that "criminality always has
been and always will be inseparably connected with and dependent upon
ethical concepts."'" It has been stated that the divergence between morality
and the criminal law tends to increase 12 The divergence which does exist
is partly intentional and partly the result of historical development."
55Train, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 3.
'oGeldart, Elements of English Law, p. 239; Allen, Legal Duties, p. 237; Stephen, General
View, p. 1.
67Train, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 4.
5sS. v. Pyles, W, Va., 12 A. L. R. 257.
59C. v. Kilwell, I Pitts. L. J. (Pa.) 255.
-cTrain, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 2.
G145 Harvard Law Review, p. 1017. Holmes, Common Law, pp. 41, 44. This was espe-
cially true in the early days of the common law. Potter, English Law, p. 295.
62Keeton. Jurisprudence. p. 195.
G3Salmond, jurisprudence, p. 235.
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MENTAL ELEMENT
The definition of crime which we have adopted as the basis of our dis-
cussion, in common with many other definitions, is also defective in that it
omits all reference to the fact that a mental element is an essential factor of
every crime.64 Statutes in some states attempt to correct this defect by de-
fining a crime as a violation of public law in the commission of which there
must be a union or joint operation of act and intention or criminal negligence."
5
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to draw an exact line between acts which are criminal
and acts which are not. The general opinion of society, finding expression
in this country through the common law or statutes, makes an act criminal
or not according to the view which it takes of the proper means of preserv-
ing order and promoting justice. The reasons which influence a country to
treat acts as crimes vary with the country and age. What therefore is crim-
inal in one jurisdiction may not be criminal in another and what may be
criminal at one period may not have been criminal at another."
Students of the criminal law, confused by the varying acts designated
crimes in different stages of development of a particular country, or in differ-
ent countries, have sought to establish some intrinsic test of criminality, and
to discover some acts which have been designated as crimes at all times and
in all places. It seems to be generally admitted, however, that an intrinsic
test of legal crime cannot be determined by an investigation of the specific
acts that have been considered crimes in different countries at different times.
An examination of present day countries yields evidence of great disagree-
ment as to what acts shall be made crimes. Differing levels of culture, dif-
ferent economic systems, differing degrees of identification of religion and
State have had their effect upon what these countries will designate crime.
7
Even 'in Pennsylvania at the present time, an examination of the acts
which are designated as crimes reveals no intrinsic characteristic which may
be adopted as an essential and universal characteristic of criminal acts.
64"N'o definition of crime current in the text books takes account of the mental attitude
of the wrongdoer." Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 217.
6156 C. J. 53,
66Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 524.
67Parsons, Crime and the Criminal, p. 129; Wickersham Report No. 13, p. 12. "New con-
ceptions of social interest cause changes in what acts are called crimes. Each country de-
termines for itself what interests are most vital to the development and security of its people
and uses the criminal law as an instrument in their furtherance and protection." Wickersham
Report No. 13, p. 11.
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The number of crimes is constantly increasing. The courts have been
restrained by the common law principle that an act to be a crime must have
a tendency to injure the public; and have not run wild. But legislatures have.
The result has been the creation of so many minor crimes that it has been
suggested that a person must be a careful student of the criminal law in or-
der to avoid being a criminal. But this is an exaggeration. It is still possible
for a careful man to exist for a considerable period of time without paying a
fine or going to jail.
It is to be regretted, however, that the opinion seems to prevail that the
law can be made an effective instrument in maintaining the social order only
by making violations of it crimes. It is to be deprecated that our law can
devise no means of regulating our existence save by threatening us with the
shaved head and the striped shirt.
